Manokwari - Papua Barat. Email: [email protected]; URL: www.wplo.org; www.oppb.org

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The Communist Party of Indonesia (in Indonesian: Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) was the largest non-ruling communist party in the world prior to being crushed in 1965 and banned the following year.[1][2][3]


An important early organization was founded by Dutch socialist Henk Sneevliet in 1914, under the name Indies Social Democratic Association (in Dutch: Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging, ISDV). ISDV was constituted essentially by the 85 members of the two Dutch socialist parties, SDAP and SDP, residing in the Dutch East Indies.[4]. The Dutch members of the ISDV introduced Marxist ideas to educated Indonesians looking for ways to oppose colonial rule.

In October 1915 ISDV started a publication in Dutch, Het Vrije Woord (The Free Word). The editor was Adolf Baars. The ISDV did not demand independence at the time of its formation. At this point ISDV had around 100 members, out of whom only three were Indonesian. However, it rapidly moved into a radical and anticapitalist direction. ISDV under Sneevliet became uncomfortable for the SDAP leadership in the Netherlands, who distanced themselves from the ISDV. In 1917 the reformist section of ISDV broke away, and formed their own Indies Social Democratic Party. In 1917 ISDV launched its first publication in Indonesian, Soeara Merdeka (The Voice of Freedom).

Sneevliet's ISDV saw the legacy of the October Revolution as the path to follow in Indonesia. The group made inroads amongst Dutch sailors and soldiers stationed in the colony. 'Red Guards' were formed, and within three months they numbered 3 000. In late 1917 soldier and sailors revolted in the major naval base of the archipelago, Surabaya, and formed soviets. The colonial authorities suppressed the Surabaya soviets and the ISDV. Dutch leaders of ISDV were sent back to the Netherlands, including Sneevliet. The leaders of the soldiers uprising were given sentences of 40 years imprisonment.[citation needed]

Meanwhile, the ISDV established a bloc within the anti-colonialist Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) organization. Two SI members from Semarang, Semaun and Darsono were attracted by Sneevliet's ideas. As a result of Sneevliet's "bloc within" strategy, many SI members were persuaded to establish the more revolutionary Marxist-dominated Sarekat Rakjat (People's Union).[5]

ISDV continued working in a clandestine manner. It launched another publication, Soeara Rakyat (The People's Voice). After the involuntary departure of several Dutch cadres, in combination with the work inside the Sarekat Islam, the membership had moved from Dutch majority to Indonesian majority. By 1919 it only had 25 Dutch members, out of a total of less than 400.[citation needed]

Establishment and growth

At the congress of ISDV on 23 May 1920 in Semarang, it took the name Perserikatan Komunis di Hindia (PKH; Communist Association of the Indies). Semaun was the party chairman and Darsosno vice-chairman. The secretary, treasurer and three of the five committee members were Dutch.[5] PKH was the first Asian communist party to become a section of the Communist International. Henk Sneevliet represented the party at the second congress of the Communist International 1921.

In the period leading up to the Sarekat Islam's sixth congress in 1921, members became aware of Sneevliet's strategy and took moves to stop it. Agus Salim, the organization's secretary, introduced a motion banning SI members from holding dual membership of other parties. Despite opposition from Tan Malaka and Semaun, the motion passed, forcing the communists to change tactics. At the same time, the Dutch colonial authorities introduced more restrictions on political activity, and Sarekat Islam decided to focus more on religious matters, leaving the communists as the only active nationalist organization.[6]

With Semaun away in Moscow attending a Far Eastern Labor Conference in early 1922, Tan Malaka tried to turn a strike of government pawnshop workers into a national strike to include all Indonesian labor unions. This failed, Tan Malaka was arrested and given a choice between internal or external exile. He chose the latter and left for Russia.[6]

In May 1922, Semaun returned after seven months in Russia and began to organize all labor unions into one organization. On 22 September, the Union of Indonesian Labor Organizations (Persatuan Vakbonded Hindia) was formed.[7]

At the fifth Comintern congress in 1924, it was emphasized that "the top priority of communist parties is to gain control of trades unions" as there could be no successful revolution without this. The PKH began concentrate on unions, decided discipline needed improving, and demanded the establishment of a Soviet Republic of Indonesia.[7]

In 1924 the party name was changed once again, to Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia).[citation needed]

The 1926 revolt

In May 1925, the Exec Committee of Comintern in a plenary session ordered communists in Indonesia to form a united anti-imperialist front with non-communist nationalist organizations, but extremist elements dominated by Alimin & Musso called for a revolution to overthrow the Dutch colonial government[8]. At a conference in Prambanan, Central Java, communist-controlled trades unions decided the revolution would start with a strike by railroad workers that would signal a general strike and then a revolution would start. This would lead to the PKI replacing the colonial government [8].

The plan was for the revolution to begin in Padang, Sumatra, but a government security clampdown at the beginning of 1926 that saw the end of the right to assembly and the arrests of PKI members forced the party to go deeper underground. Splits among PKI leaders as to the timing and course of the revolution resulted in poor planning. Tan Malaka, at the time Comintern's agent for Southeast Asia and Australia did not agree with the plot, partly because he believed the PKI had insufficient mass support. As a result of these divisions, in June 1926, the revolution was postponed.

However, there was a limited revolt in Batavia (as Jakarta was then known), which broke out on 12 November. Similar actions took place in Padang, Bantam and Surabaya. In Batavia, the revolt was crushed within a day or two, and after a few weeks it had been comprehensively defeated throughout the country.[9]

As a result of the failed revolution, 13,000 people were arrested, 4,500 imprisoned, 1,308 interned, and 823 exiled to Digul, West New Guinea.[10] Several died while in captivity. Many non-communist political activists were also targeted by the colonial authorities, under the pretext of suppressing the communist rebellion. The party was outlawed by the Dutch East Indies government in 1927. The PKI went underground and Dutch, and later Japanese, surveillance ensured that it was never a disciplined or coherent organisation for the remainder of the pre-war period.[11]

During the initial period of illegality PKI kept a somewhat lower profile, with much of its leadership imprisoned. In 1935 the PKI leader Musso returned from his exile in Moscow to reorganize the underground, or "illegal" PKI. His stay in Indonesia was however rather brief. The party now worked within various fronts, such as Gerindo and trade unions. In Holland PKI started working amongst Indonesian students within the nationalist organization Perhimpunan Indonesia, an organization which was soon to be under the control of the PKI.[12]

Post-war resurgence

The PKI re-emerged on the political scene after the Japanese surrender in 1945, and it actively took part in the struggle for independence from the Netherlands. Many armed units were under PKI control or influence. Although PKI militias played an important role in fighting against Dutch, President Sukarno was concerned the growing influence of PKI would eventually threaten his position. Moreover, the growth of PKI troubled the more right-wing sectors of the Indonesian polity as well as some foreign powers, especially the vigorously anti-communist United States. Thus the relationship between the PKI and other forces also fighting for independence was generally a difficult one.

In February 1948 PKI and leftist sectors of the Socialist Party of Indonesia (Partai Sosialis Indonesia) formed a joint front, People's Democratic Front. The front did not last, but the leftist section of PSI later merged with PKI. By this time the Pesindo militias were under the control of PKI.

On August 11, 1948 Musso returned to Jakarta after twelve years in the Soviet Union. The PKI politburo was reconstructed, including Dipa Nusantara Aidit, M.H. Lukman and Njoto.

After signing the Renville Agreement in 1948, many of the Republican armed units returned from zones of conflict. This gave the Indonesian right-wing some confidence that they would be able to counter PKI militarily. Guerrilla units and militias under the influence of PKI were ordered to disband. In Madiun a group PKI militaries refused to go along with the disarmament were killed in September the same year. The killings sparked a violent uprising. This provided a pretext to clamp down on the PKI. It was claimed by army sources that PKI had announced the proclamation of the 'Soviet Republic of Indonesia' on September 18 with Musso as its president and Amir Sjarifuddin as its prime minister. At the same time PKI had denounced the uprising and appealed for calm. The uprising was suppressed by republican troops and PKI passed through yet another period of repression. On September 30 Madiun was taken over by republican troops of the Siliwangi division. Thousands of party cadres were killed and 36 000 were imprisoned. Amongst the executed were several leaders including Musso who was killed on October 31, allegedly while trying to escape from prison. Aidit and Lukman went into exile in the People's Republic of China. However, PKI was not banned and continued to function. The reconstruction of the party began in 1949.

In 1950 the party started publishing again, with the main organs being Harian Rakyat and Bintang Merah. In the 1950s the PKI committed itself to a nationalist position under the leadership of Dipa Nusantara Aidit, supporting the anti-colonialist and anti-western policy of the Indonesian president Sukarno. Aidit and the section around him, including young leaders such as Sudisman, Lukman, Njoto and Sakirman, who took charge of the party in 1951. None were more than 30 years old at the time. Under Aidit PKI grew rapidly, from around 3-5 000 in 1950, to 165 000 members in 1954 to 1.5 million in 1959.[13]

In August 1951 PKI led series of militant strikes, which were followed by clamp-downs in Medan and Jakarta. The PKI leadership went underground for a brief period.


Before the election of 1955, PKI favoured Sukarno's plans for 'guided democracy' and was an active supporter of Sukarno.[14] In the 1955 elections PKI came fourth with 16% of the votes. It won 39 seats (out of 257) and 80 out of 514 in the Constituent Assembly.

Opposition to the continued Dutch control over Irian Jaya was an issue often raised by PKI during the 1950s.

In July 1957 there was a grenade attack on the PKI office in Jakarta. In the same month PKI made advances in municipal elections. In September the same year the Islamist Masyumi publicly demanded that PKI should be banned.[15]

On December 3 trade unions, largely under control of PKI, started seizing control of Dutch-owned companies. These seizures paved the way for the nationalization of foreign-owned enterprises. The struggles against foreign capitalists gave the PKI the opportunity to profile itself as a national party.

In February 1958 a coup attempt was made by pro-U.S. forces amongst the military and the political right-wing. The rebels, based in Sumatra and Sulawesi, proclaimed a Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia) on February 15. This so-called Revolutionary Government immediately began arresting thousands of PKI members in the areas under their control. PKI supported the efforts by Sukarno to quell the rebellion, including introduction of martial law. The rebellion was eventually defeated.

In August 1959 there was an attempt on behalf of the military to prevent the holding of the PKI congress. However the congress was held as scheduled, and was addressed by Sukarno himself. In 1960 Sukarno launched the slogan Nasakom, an abbreviation of Nasionalisme (Nationalism), Agama (Religion), Komunisme (Communism). Thus the role of PKI as a junior partner in the Sukarno polity was institutionalized. The PKI welcomed the launching of the Nasakom concept, seeing it in terms of a multiclass united front.


Although PKI supported Sukarno, it did not lose its political autonomy. In March 1960 the PKI denounced the undemocratic handling of the budget by Sukarno. On July 8 Harian Rakyat carried an article critical of the government. The PKI leadership was arrested by the army, but later released on orders of Sukarno.

When idea of Malaysia was conceived, it was rejected by the PKI as well as the Communist Party of Malaya.

With growing popular support and a membership of about 3 million by 1965, the PKI was the strongest communist party outside the Soviet Union and China. The party had a firm base in various mass organizations, such as the All-Indonesian Central Labour Organisation (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), People's Youth (Pemuda Rakyat), Indonesian Women's Movement (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia), Peasants Front of Indonesia (Barisan Tani Indonesia), the League of People's Culture (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat) and the Association of Scholars of Indonesia (Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia). Estimates claim that the total membership of the party and its frontal organizations might have at its peak organized a fifth of the Indonesian population.

In March 1962 PKI joined the government. PKI leaders Aidit and Njoto were named advisory ministers. In April PKI held its party congress. In 1963 the governments of Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines engaged in discussions on territorial disputes and the possibility of a Maphilindo Confederation, an idea launched by the Philippine president Macapagal. The PKI rejected the ideas of Maphilindo and Malaysian federation. PKI militants crossed over into Malaysia and engaged in combat against British and Australian forces there. Some groups reached Malaya, to join the struggle there. However, most of them were captured on arrival. Most of the PKI combat units were active in border regions of Borneo.

In January 1964 PKI started confiscating British properties owned by British companies in Indonesia.

In the mid 1960s the U.S. State Department estimated the party membership to be approximately 2 million (3.8% of the working age population of the country).[16]

Mass killings and the end of the PKI

See also: Indonesian killings of 1965�66 and Transition to the New Order

Sukarno's balancing act between the PKI, the military, nationalist factions, and Islamic groups was threatened by the PKI's rise. The growing influence of the PKI concerned the United States and other anti-communist western powers. The political and economic situation had become more volatile; annual inflation reached over 600 per cent and living conditions for Indonesians worsened.

In December 1964 Chaerul Saleh of the Murba Party (formed by former PKI leader Tan Malaka) claimed that PKI was preparing a coup d'�tat. The PKI demanded a ban on the Murba Party, which was enforced by Sukarno in early 1965. In the context of Konfrontasi with Malaysia, the PKI called for 'arming the people'. Large sectors of the army were opposed to this. Sukarno remained officially non-committal. In July around 2000 PKI members started military training near Halim Air Force Base. Notably the concept of 'arming the people' had won support amongst the Air Force and the Navy. On September 8 PKI demonstrators initiated a two-day siege of the US Consulate in Surabaya. On September 14 Aidit addressed a PKI rally, urging members to be vigilant to things to come. On September 30 Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani, both PKI-associated organizations, held a mass rally in Jakarta against the inflation crisis.

On the night of 30 September and 1 October, six of Indonesia's top generals were killed and their bodies thrown down a well. The generals' killers announced the following morning that the new Revolutionary Council had seized power, calling themselves the "30 September Movement" ("G30S"). With much of the army's top leadership either dead or missing, General Suharto took control of the army and put down the abortive coup by 2 October. The army quickly blamed the coup attempt on the PKI and instigated an Indonesia-wide anti-Communist propaganda campaign. Evidence linking the PKI to the generals' assassinations is inconclusive, leading to speculation that their involvement was very limited, or that Suharto organised the events, in whole or part, and scapegoated the communists.[2] In the ensuing violent anti-communist purge, an estimated 500,000 communists (real and suspected) were killed, and the PKI effectively eliminated (see Indonesian killings of 1965�66. General Suharto out-maneuvered Sukarno politically and was appointed president in 1968, consolidating is influence over the military and government.

On October 2 the Halim base was "captured" by the army. The Harian Rakyat issue carried an article in support of the G30S coup, but speculation later arose concerning whether it actually represented the opinions of PKI.[who?] Otherwise the official line of PKI at the time was that the G30S was an internal affair within the armed forces. On October 6 the Sukarno's cabinet held its first meeting since September 30. PKI ministers attend. A resolution denouncing G30S was passed. Njoto was arrested directly after the meeting.

A massive manifestation was held in Jakarta two days later, demanding a ban on the PKI. The main office of PKI was burned down. On October 13 the Islamic organization Ansor held anti-PKI rallies across Java. On October 18 around a hundred PKI were killed by Ansor. The systematic extermination of the party had begun.

Between 300,000 and one million Indonesians were killed in the mass killings that followed. [17] [3] The victims included non-Communists who were slain because of mistaken identity or "guilt by association." However, the lack of information makes it impossible to pinpoint an exact figure of casualties. Many scholars today suggest that the figure is between 200,000 and 500,000. [18] Lists of suspected communists were supplied to the Indonesian military by the CIA. A CIA study of the events in Indonesia assessed that "In terms of the numbers killed the anti-PKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century..." [19].

Time presented the following account on December 17, 1966 :

Communists, red sympathizers and their families are being massacred by the thousands. Backlands army units are reported to have executed thousands of communists after interrogation in remote jails. Armed with wide-bladed knives called parangs, Moslem bands crept at night into the homes of communists, killing entire families and burying their bodies in shallow graves. The murder campaign became so brazen in parts of rural East Java, that Moslem bands placed the heads of victims on poles and paraded them through villages. The killings have been on such a scale that the disposal of the corpses has created a serious sanitation problem in East Java and Northern Sumatra where the humid air bears the reek of decaying flesh. Travelers from those areas tell of small rivers and streams that have been literally clogged with bodies.

Although the motives for the killings seemed political, some scholars argue that the events were caused by a state of panic and political uncertainty. Part of the anti-Communist force that was responsible for the massacres were made up of members of the criminal underworld, given permission to engage in senseless acts of violence.[20] Other motives have been explored, such as running amok or an allusion to Javanense puppet-play (wayang)[4].

Amongst the worst affected areas was the island of Bali, where PKI had grown rapidly prior to the crackdown. On November 11 clashes erupted between the PKI and PNI, ending in massacres of PKI accused members and sympathizers. Whereas much of the anti-PKI pogroms in the rest of the country were carried out by Islamic political organizations in the name of jihad, the killings in Bali were done in the name of Hinduism. Bali stood out as the only place in the country where local soldiers in some way intervened to lessen the slaughter.

On November 22, Aidit was captured and killed.

In December the military proclaimed that Aceh had been cleared of communists. Simultaneously, Special Military Courts were set up to try jailed PKI members. On March 12, the party was formally banned by Suharto, and the pro-PKI trade union SOBSI was banned in April.

Some of these tumultuous events were fictionalized in the popular novel and film The Year of Living Dangerously (1982).

Post-1965 developments

In spite of initial sporadic resistance, PKI stood paralysed after the 1965-1966 killings. In September 1966 the remnants of the party politburo issued a statement of self-criticism, criticizing the previous cooperation with the Sukarno regime.

After the killings of Aidit and Njoto, Sudisman took over party leadership. In 1967 he was sentenced to death.

Some cadres of PKI had taken refuge in Blitar, Eastern Java, following the crackdown on the party. Amongst the leaders present were the youth leader Sukatno, the deputy chairman of SOBSI, Ruslan Widjayasastra and Professor Iskandar Subekti, assistant to Aidit. Blitar was an underdeveloped area were PKI had strong support amongst the peasantry. The military was unaware that PKI had been able to consolidate itself there. But in March 1968 violence erupted in Blitar, as local peasants attacked leaders and cadres of Nahdatul Ulama, as a revenge for the role it had played in anticommunist persecutions. Around 60 NU cadres were killed. It is however unlikely that the killings of NU cadres in Blitar had been conducted on the orders of PKI. The military became aware of the PKI enclave and crushed it. Sukatno, Ruslan and Iskandar Subekti were captured and sentenced to death.

Some party cadres were temporarily outside Indonesia at the time of the September 30 events. Notably a sizeable delegation had travelled to the People's Republic of China to participate in the anniversary celebrations of the Chinese Revolution. Others had left Indonesia to pursue studies in Eastern Europe. In exile a party apparatus continued to function. It was, however, largely isolated from political developments inside Indonesia. In Java, some villages that were known to be refuges for members or suspected sympathisers were identified by authorities and were kept under careful watch for a considerable time.

As of 2004, former PKI members remain blacklisted from many occupations including government jobs. During his presidency Abdurrahman Wahid invited former PKI exiles to return to Indonesia in 1999, and proposed removing restrictions on open discussion of the communist ideology. In arguing for the removal of the ban, Wahid cited Indonesia's original 1945 constitution, which did not prohibit or even specifically mention communism. Wahid's proposal was vigorously opposed by some sectors of Indonesian society, especially conservative Islamic groups. In an April 2000 protest, a group called the Indonesian Islamic Front rallied ten thousand people in Jakarta against Wahid's proposal. The Army did not immediately reject the proposal, but promised a "comprehensive and meticulous study" of the idea.[21]


General References

  • Mortimer, Rex (1974). Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965 Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York ISBN 0-8014-0825-3
  • Sinaga, Edward Djanner (1960) Communism and the Communist Party in IndonesiaMA Thesis, George Washington University School of Government


  1. ^ Mortimer (1974) p19
  2. ^ Ricklefs(1982)p259
  3. ^ Thirdworldtraveler.com
  4. ^ marxist.com
  5. ^ a b Sinaga (1960) p2
  6. ^ a b Sinaga (1960) p7
  7. ^ a b Sinaga (1960) p9
  8. ^ a b Sinaga (1960) p10
  9. ^ Sinaga (1960) p12
  10. ^ Sinaga (1960) p14
  11. ^ Reid, Anthony (1973). The Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950. Melbourne: Longman Pty Ltd, p.83. ISBN 0-582-71046-4. 
  12. ^ marxist.org
  13. ^ Communism and Stalinism in Indonesia. Workers' Liberty #61, February 2000
  14. ^ Indonesians Go to the Polls: The Parties and their Stand on Constitutional Issues by Harold F. Gosnell. In Midwest Journal of Political Science May, 1958. p. 189
  15. ^ The Sukarno years: 1950 to 1965
  16. ^ Benjamin, Roger W.; Kautsky, John H.. Communism and Economic Development, in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 1. (Mar., 1968), pp. 122.
  17. ^ Robert Cribb, ed., The Indonesian killings of 1965-1966: studies from Java and Bali (Clayton, Vic.: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia no 21, 1990).
  18. ^ Totten, Samuel (2004). Century of Genocide. New York: Routledge, p.239. ; Robert Cribb, "How many deaths? Problems in the statistics of massacre in Indonesia (1965-1966) and East Timor (1975-1980)" Violence in Indonesia. Ed. Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimh�fer. Hamburg: Abera, 2001. 82-98. [1]
  19. ^ Kahin, George McT. and Kahin, Audrey R. Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia. New York: The New Press, 1995.
  20. ^ Totten, Samuel (2004). Century of Genocide. New York: Routledge, p.238. 
  21. ^ Asian News Digest (2000) 1(18):279 and 1(19):295-296.

External links

Further reading

  • Jochen Hippler, Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, Amr Hamzawy: Krieg, Repression, Terrorismus. Politische Gewalt und Zivilisation in westlichen und muslimischen Gesellschaften. ifa, Stuttgart 2006, S. 55-58 (Review)
  • J.L. Holzgrefe / Robert O. Keohane: Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge (2003). ISBN 052152928X, S. 47
  • Mark Levene u. Penny Roberts: The Massacre in History. (1999). ISBN 1571819355, S. 247-251
  • Robert Cribb, 'The Indonesian Marxist tradition', in C.P. Mackerras and N.J. Knight, eds, Marxism in Asia (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 251-272 [5].
The West New Guinea settlement in 1962


 Report by Antena Nederland



Frankly, there is very little information about West New Guinea even from official version, except that West New Guinea was a part of the Netherlands East Indies and was retained by the Dutch after the transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia on 27th December 1949. After the constant agitation by the Republic of Indonesia to acquire West New Guinea, the Netherlands was forced to turning it over to the control of the United Nations on 15 August 1962. On 1st May 1963, the United Nations turned it over to the Republic of Indonesia, which created it the province of West Irian.

Although the official version of West New Guinea is somewhat "with nothing to say", the US/CIA documents tell a lot. Before we have further discussion, please remember two things:


  1. on 5 March 1960 President Sukarno dissolved Parliament ('DPR') which was the result of an election on 29th September 1955 and created a new parliament ('DPRGR'). More importantly, Masyumi, a non-communist party which held 21% seats in 'DPR', was banned because of its involvement during the PRRI/Permesta Rebelion; and PKI gained more political strength in Indonesian politics.
  2. President Sukarno launched a military campaign against the Dutch over West New Guinea on 18th December 1961

Now, let's look at what was the US reaction after President Sukarno launched the military campaign. On the same day, Mr. Robert H. Johnson (the National Security Council Staff) wrote a letter to Mr. Bundy (President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs) and his letter reads as follows (see ref. [4]):

Attachment (Secret)

Washington,December 18,1961

Some Fundamentals With Respect to West New Guinea


  1. "The U.S. Interest." The U.S. has a general interest in eliminating this irritant in international relations involving two free world countries. But its more basic interest are two:
    (a). to eliminate this issue from Indonesian politics where it has diverted the country from constructive tasks, has been used by Sukarno as a means of frustrating opposition to himself, and has been exploited by the large local Communist Party (PKI - phs) and by the USSR,
    (b). to avoid a military clash ... (deleted by phs).. because such a clash would probably strengthen Communist forces within Indonesia. The loss of Indonesia could be as significant as the loss of mainland Southeast Asia and would make defence of the latter considerably more difficult.

    ... (deleted by phs)... If the above analysis is correct, we must conclude that it is in our interests that a solution be devised which will lead to accesion of West New Guinea to Indonesia. ... (deleted by phs)... As the State paper says somewhat more cautiously - "basically, we recognize that for historical, geographical and political reasons West New Guinea probably will tend to closer, if not complete, association with Indonesia and our role in seeking a settlement will be to facilitate this evolution."


  2. "The Validity of the Self-Determination Principle for West New Guinea" .... (deleted by phs)....
  3. "The Current Situation".... (deleted by phs)...
  4. "The Value of Negotiations" Negotiations will serve very little purpose if we approach them in the same spirit that has motivated some of our current diplomatic activity on the subject;... (deleted by phs)... Our role must be grounded in the conclusion that the only solution that will be lasting and that will serve U.S. interests will be one that gives Indonesia a clear prospect of acquiring early control over the territory..... (deleted by phs)........
    In order to accomplish this objective we must make very clear to the Dutch that we are not taken in by the idea that self- determination principle has any reality when applied to West New Guinea. We must also talk very frankly with them (and with the Australians) about the danger of the loss of Indonesia to Communism by the West New Guinea issue and the damage that much loss would cause to the free world position in Southeast Asia.... (deleted by phs)....

2 (two) weeks before negotiations between the Dutch and Indonesian government started on 20th March 1962 for the West New Guinea settlement, another secret US document prepared by CIA, the Departments of State, Defence, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and NSA, reads as follows (see ref. [5]):

        NIE 55-62                            Washington, March 7,1962                             The Prospects for Indonesia                                    The Problem         To analyze the major trends in Indonesia and to estimate pro-         bable developments over the next year or so with special re-         ference to Indonesia's international orientation and to the         West New Guinea dispute.                                    Conclusions         1. Until a settlement satisfactory to Sukarno is reached with            the Netherlands, the West New Guinea dispute will continue            to overshadow and strongly influence all other foreign and            domestic issues in Indonesia.  Sukarno will probably even            closer to the (communist) Bloc position on major interna-            tional issues as Indonesia continues to rely heavily on            Soviet military aid and political support for the prosecu-            tion of the West New Guinea campaign.  The Indonesian Com-            munist Party (PKI) will continue to exploit the issue and            to obstruct a negotiated settlement.  The diversion of army            energies into the West New Guinea campaign will continue to            hamper its efforts to reduce PKI strength and influence..            .. (deleted by phs)...         2. ... (deleted by phs)... In the event of a settlement, the            army would probably give greater attention to countering            PKI influence in the country.         ... (deleted by phs).... 

As it can be seen above, the West New Guinea settlement had been made in advance by the USA as early as 1961 and even before the negotiations between the Dutch and Indonesian governments began on 20th March 1963. The US settlement was that West New Guinea should be a part of the Republic of Indonesia because:


  1. the PKI could not gain strength in Indonesia by exploiting West New Guinea dispute anymore,
  2. the Indonesian army would concentrate its energy more on reducing the PKI's strength (note: it was better than the previous situation where the Indonesian army had to divide its attention between PKI and West New Guinea).

It is also not surprising that the US representatives were very active in the West New Guinea settlement and sponsored the negotiations between the Dutch and Indonesian representatives carried out in Middleburg, Virginia, on 20th March 1962. The talks were formally under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General (U Thant), but required the third party as a mediator. It is also not surprising with the previously mentioned US foreign policy, that the mediator was chosen to be Mr. Ellsworth Bunker, a then-retired American diplomat (see ref. [6]).
It can be noticed a telegram from the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to the US Embassy in Indonesia on March 6, 1962. The telegram reads as follows (see ref. [7]):

                                    Washington, March 6, 1962, 8:57pm          .... Secretary (of State, Dean Rusk) has asked Dutch consider         following individuals for third party role: Ellsworth Bunker,         Frederic Boland, Ernest Gross, Eugene Black, Walt Rostow, John         McCloy, Hamilton Fish Armstrong.  In our view Bunker would be         particularly outstanding candidate.          Request you see Sukarno or Subandrio soonest and pass on sub-         stance this message including list of names suggested to         Dutch.  You should stress Secretary's view that Bunker would         be absolutely first class.  Believe with favorable Indo         reaction this message we should be able firm up arrangements         for secret talks get under way.

Now, we know that from the beginning USA had insisted Ellsworth Bunker to be the mediator. And, we know that the main task of Ellsworth Bunker during the West New Guinea negotiations was that he had to hand over West New Guinea to the Republic of Indonesia as soon as possible, regardless of Holland's position or even West New Guinea's position.